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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The privatisation of state-owned assets, a defining characteristic of the 1980s, 
was not restricted to the United Kingdom. In New Zealand, the Labour 
Government which took office in 1984, was committed to a policy of what was 
known at the time as „corporatisation‟ – converting government departments 
and other agencies which had commercial functions, into proper commercial 
entities, and then privatising many of them. The railway operation had already 
been converted to a commercial structure, in 1982, and it was eventually 
privatised in 1993. However, it was how the markets in which the railway 
operation worked would develop, that would prove to be „a bridge too far‟ for the 
railway‟s privatisation. Although the network had not been split out in the sale 
process as it was in Great Britain, the whole company eventually had to be 
saved from bankruptcy. It has now been repurchased completely. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the situation in New Zealand, and then 
to compare it with other industry privatisations which have worked. This paper 
will argue that the critical difference between rail and other formerly nationalised 
industries lies in its subsidy requirement – what people are prepared to pay for 
railway services, only rarely bears any relation to what those railway services 
cost to provide – and further, that those services are provided by an effective 
monopoly. It is the combination of these two aspects which proved fatal for the 
New Zealand rail privatisation (that is, once the rail freight market went into 
failure), given the clear Government desire to retain the railway network at its 
current extent. 
 
The paper‟s structure is as follows. First, it looks at the way that the railway in 
New Zealand was privatised. Second, it introduces a model of industry structure 
as an explanatory variable for understanding why many privatisations within the 
transport sector and elsewhere have worked and some railway ones have not. 
Third, it argues from that basis as to why privatisation could not have worked 
under these circumstances. Fourth, it provides some comment on the 
implications of this for public policy, including that in a British context.  
 
   
 
2. PRIVATISING A RAILWAY – A UNIFIED APPROACH 
 
We begin with the situation of the railway network in New Zealand. In total route 
length longer than the railway in Scotland, it is principally a freight-based railway 
carrying 14.4m loaded tonnes of freight per year (3.96 bn tonne-kilometres) 
over 4,100km of network 3. When it was privatised, it was as one single 
operation, thus avoiding many of the problems inherent in the way it was done 
in Great Britain. The freight market faced by Tranz Rail (the company‟s name 
after June 1993) was extremely competitive, and as a result there was no 
provision of, or indeed need for, an independent commercial regulator. Yet, this 
privatisation failed as well, with the operator (from 2004, the Australian logistics 
firm Toll Holdings) bought out by the New Zealand Government in May of 2008.  
 
However, when one considers that the genesis of the New Zealand privatisation 
goes back to the early 1980s, it is clear that its present situation has been a 
very long time in the making 4. Before 1982 the railways in New Zealand were 
organised as a Government department, directly responsible to a minister. In 
that year it was converted into a proper commercial structure, answering to a 
commercial Board. For example, instead of the total annual losses being paid 
for via a grant from the Treasury, which was the practice before 1982, the 
passenger services were supported via a „transparent‟ above-line payment, 
which was then treated as revenue. A great deal of debt was also written off at 
this time. Over the next few years, there was substantial investment in the 
freight network, including the electrification of a large part of the main freight 
line, and the beginnings of a large truck (lorry) operation.  The idea was that this 
investment would pay for itself, which – given the road charging (tax) structure 
facing the truck sector (refer fn. 7) and higher oil prices (in real terms close to 
even today‟s levels) – it should have done. It did not, and by 1990 the 
government was facing a situation whereby the rail company was left with 
another huge debt – the situation that the 1982 reforms had been intended to 
avoid. At the time, it is not surprising that the New Zealand Treasury was 
looking quite seriously at a complete abandonment of the system, or at the very 
least a substantial winding-back. Hence the interest in privatisation: it was seen 
as the only way of avoiding a situation where in future, railways turned once 
again into a „money pit‟, although this was never explicitly admitted to. The 
option of splitting the operation and the track was considered at this time, but 
not proceeded with because it was thought that selling a combined operation 
would maximise the sale price over selling it in pieces, and because of the 
perception that significant operational difficulties would arise from separating 
wheel and rail. At that stage, there were no precedents for how this would work 
in practice. 
 
Eventually, and after writing off some $NZ1.2 bn in debt (about £500m) and with 
a cash injection of a further $NZ360m (about £140m), the company was put on 
the market. In the end it was sold in 1993 for about $NZ330m, on the clear 
understanding that there would be no more public money put into it, except for 
specifics like the day-to-day subsidy requirements of the two suburban 
passenger operations (managed and paid for via the local equivalent of a PTE). 
The aim of the privatisation process was to leave the company in the situation in 
which it could at least cover its operating costs and earn a genuine financial 
  
return on its investment. This also meant that the government wrote off most of 
the sunk or replacement costs of the operation. At an estimated $4 bn, 
excluding land, the replacement value of the business was far more than the 
business‟s sale price 5.  
 
The new owners, who christened the business „Tranzrail‟, did invest in the 
freight operation – some $NZ900m of capital expenditure in the next seven or 
eight years, or nearly three times the initial purchase price. Again, the original 
expectation was that this investment would be paid for in higher volumes and 
rates. By 2000, however, if not before, it had become clear that this strategy 
was failing as well; the volumes had materialised, and this had led to increasing 
operating costs, but the higher rates had not, leaving the company with an on- 
and off-balance sheet debt it was increasingly unable to service. Not sur-
prisingly, the-then institutional investors decided to sell up while they could. The 
problem, it is now clear, was that even within a unified system, the company‟s 
freight operations were simply not commercially viable, certainly at that extent of 
the network. What was also increasingly apparent was that the rail freight 
market within New Zealand was showing significant signs of market failure; that 
is, demand for rail services was simply not nearly strong enough to meet the 
operational costs of the railway system and also generate a return on the capital 
invested in the business. 
 
To understand why, we need to look at the structure of the freight market in 
New Zealand. It is roughly split by tonne-kilometres as follows: over two-thirds 
by truck, seventeen percent rail and fifteen percent coastal shipping 6. In recent 
years, significant structural change within the economy has weakened rail‟s 
competitive position. For example, bulk loads like forestry have had their ability-
to-pay for rail services limited by lower prices for timber on world markets; 
meaning that if rail is going to capture the traffic at all, it will generally have to do 
so at an economic loss. Other bulk traffics, such as heavy manufacturing, have 
dried up as New Zealand has morphed into a services-based economy. The 
freight markets which are growing tend to be in areas such as FMCGs, (fast-
moving-consumer-goods) where rail cannot supply the standard of service the 
market wants, and will pay for, at a price anywhere within range of what the 
trucking industry can do it for. This loss of the market also means that rail‟s very 
high fixed costs have now had to be shared out across lighter traffic loads, 
which has further worked against the company‟s financial viability. A further 
quirk of the New Zealand arrangements is the high volume (by tonne-km) 
carried by coastal shipping. This, a function of our geography, tends to include 
bulk traffics such as petroleum products and cement; traffics that anywhere else 
would be carried by rail.  
 
Trucking‟s cost of supply is such that it could easily secure most of these 
traffics; covering all its financial costs, including New Zealand‟s fairly high road 
user charges 7. That was why over this period the operation also developed its 
trucking branch, finding very quickly that it was both cheaper and faster to move 
a lot of its market that way. As it turned out, Tranz Rail had the second-largest 
truck fleet in the country, provided via owner-drivers. It was modally agnostic if a 
truck service was the best answer for the customer, which was frequently the 
case.  The net result of these market factors was that in the business could not 
   
 
pay its way (at a conference in June 2000, a senior manager admitted in public 
that since privatisation the company had invested “$700m in the freight network 
[up to that point], which was twice its profitability over this period” 8). That lack of 
profitability was not the fault of a private ownership structure, but rather a 
reflection of market realities. Rail was simply unable to charge prices in that 
market, that were sufficient to cover the business‟s costs. Road freight did not 
have that problem.  
 
The new Board‟s response in 2000 to this situation was to bring in a whole new 
management team, which mostly included people from a shipping background 
(why shipping, where the operating environment is the near-complete opposite 
of that facing rail, has never been explained to anyone‟s satisfaction). It is clear 
that the management had already realised that there was only a little residual 
value left in the freight group. However, this could not have been admitted to, as 
the effect on the share price would have been catastrophic. So their response 
was to sell everything else for which a market price could be achieved, including 
attempting to sell both suburban rail operations to their respective PTEs (one 
sale did proceed, and it is now operated in a fashion similar to a British TOC). 
Over this period, operational problems were becoming more and more obvious 
as well. For example, there was a mounting number of complaints about badly-
maintained equipment as well as badly-maintained track; a clear sign that the 
operation was not generating the money it needed to. Essentially, the market 
environment was against it: while the company complained about „unfair‟ truck 
competition, the fact was that most of that traffic was not available to rail, there 
was not that much rail traffic that was equivalently „unavailable‟ to the truck 
market and the rail operation had its own trucking operation anyway. 
  
Over the next two years, as the share price continued to collapse, increasingly 
frantic efforts were made to rescue the situation. Negotiations with the 
Government had begun in early 2002. However, the Government was most 
unwilling to provide the company with a blank cheque, making it clear that it was 
not going to put in money unless it had control of where the money went to. One 
option would have been to have given the Government several seats on the 
board and full access to the books for a large annual payment; but the major 
owners were not prepared to bear the dilution in control that this would have 
meant. Another part of the problem, also evident by the middle of 2003 if not 
before, was that the company‟s bankers had lost confidence in the company as 
well and were treating it as a bad business risk. So that had forced the 
company‟s hand as much as the Government‟s actions had.  
 
Once the company ceased to be financially viable, the failure of its privatisation 
was inevitable. In July 2003 – and with receivership (administration) now staring 
the company in the face – Tranz Rail admitted defeat and accepted a 
Government deal which saw the Government take the network off the 
company‟s hands in exchange for the Government picking up $NZ328m of debt. 
From a commercial point of view, this measure was intended to reduce the 
company‟s debt-equity ratio, by improving the ratio of assets to debt, although 
the company‟s net value remained the same. In other words, the business‟s risk 
profile was reduced, although the fragmentation of the business would have 
added to costs. Shortly thereafter the network was set up as a separate 
  
company and structure, thus replicating the UK‟s situation, if on a much smaller 
scale *. A large number of pressure groups, such as the rail unions, had been 
wanting this to happen, on the basis that it would give the Government the 
effective control it needed. This was true, but what the groups did not then 
appreciate was that the Government buying back the track meant also that it 
was left „holding the baby‟ in terms of fixing all the problems which had now built 
up. The original estimate when the track was bought back was that $NZ200m 
would be needed to fix it; the reality over the next few years proved to be far 
more than this (refer Heatley (2009), p38ff). The operational side of the 
business was then purchased by the Australian freight and logistics group Toll 
Holdings. 
 
This refinancing could have been enough to stabilise the situation; again, it was 
not. The Government told the network company to levy access charges at a 
level that would allow the Government to earn a commercial rate of return on 
the money it had put into saving the system, making the rescue a cash-neutral 
proposition. It was still not interested, at that stage, in giving the operator yet 
more subsidy. The result of this approach was a „Mexican standoff‟ between the 
Government and the operator. Toll‟s response was to argue that if they had to 
pay those charges and pass them through to their customers, they would lose 
the business; either to truck or shipping companies, or the traffic would not 
move at all. If they didn‟t pass on the charges they would cease to make any 
meaningful return on their own investment. By the end of 2006, relations had 
got to the point that Toll was threatening to pull a large number of marginal 
freight services – a current and very unofficial estimate was that the services  
run over about half the network were at risk of abandonment at that stage, and 
on justifiable commercial grounds 9. The New Zealand Treasury later came to 
agree with Toll‟s assessment of the situation 10. That these services were at 
best marginal, if not clearly unprofitable, had been known for quite some time, 
but the previous management(s) had not been able to do anything about them. 
 
The Government knew full well that if Toll couldn‟t make a go of making these 
services pay their way, no-one else could +. This dispute would not normally 
have registered on their „radar‟, as the Government of the time was reasonably 
non-interventionist. However, there is a great deal of public concern about the 
number of heavy trucks on the New Zealand roading system, which has far less 
motorway or even dual-carriageway than its equivalent in Great Britain, and 
                                                 
*
  One important qualifier here with reference to the UK situation should also be made. New 
Zealand public finance is not affected by a PSBR-type rule which would have forced the 
railway industry to have been put into a “clg” structure because of the size of its borrowings. 
+
 A similar „Mexican standoff‟ had also developed between the company and the two regional 
councils (equivalent to British PTEs) which funded urban passenger rail services. The 
councils were resentful at having to spend a lot of their own money to support the operations, 
and, citing „monopoly issues‟, made it clear that they wanted more control as to where the 
money went. As time went by the Government‟s attitude was similar. At the root of the 
councils‟ frustration, however, was the unwillingness on the part of central Government to 
provide a decent level of financial support at that time for passenger transport, especially for 
new investment. This was another reason, from the company‟s point of view, behind wanting 
to sell the urban passenger operations, although in the end only one was sold. A separate 
exercise to sell the long-distance (tourist) rail business also failed, after the business was 
part-sold and then had to be bought back. 
   
 
almost no inter-urban motorway. Keeping freight on rail is perceived to have 
significant road safety as well as environmental benefits, and as a result there 
was and is keen political pressure to see rail freight services maintained. So the 
Government decided that it was far better to own rail, regardless of its loss-
making status and demands for more expenditure, as this was seen as the most 
practical way of securing the variety of wider benefits that the railway is 
perceived to provide. Hence the operation‟s repurchase in May of 2008. The 
network operation was formally combined back into the main company in 
October of the same year.  
 
The option of abandoning much or all of the network, as had been considered in 
1990, was simply not acceptable to the Government, given their desire to use 
the railway system to meet a number of environmental and other public policy 
goals, for which the railway is effectively a monopoly provider. This is distinct 
from provision of service in a market, where Tranz Rail‟s situation is extremely 
competitive. The desire to reduce the Government‟s financial exposure from the 
rail operation was placed to one side, because of the desire to see the railway 
used to promote a number of other non-market goals, including regional 
development, environmental sustainability (rail‟s fuel use is measurably lower 
than that of trucks) and road safety 11. It also says a lot about the way that the 
freight market runs in New Zealand, when compared with the way one might 
like it to run, that Toll has retained the trucking part of the operation – clearly, 
they saw it as commercially viable. Indeed, in the week the sale of the rail 
operation was announced, they went off and bought a truck company in a part 
of New Zealand where they did not have much market presence 12.  
 
2.1 Common lessons with Great Britain 
Although the New Zealand and British systems are very different, there are a 
number of common lessons which can be drawn from what happened. In both 
privatisations, the common reason underlying them both was to save money. 
Specifically: in New Zealand, the concern was to remove the risk of having to 
bail out the system again, although this was never really admitted to. The sale 
price of the business certainly reflected the clear assumption that no further 
subsidy would be paid for freight services. In Great Britain, it is clear that a lot of 
the process was motivated by the desire to maximise returns to the Treasury 13, 
and it also seems to have been the view that restructuring would lead to a situ-
ation where subsidy would no longer be required. The mistake was possibly in 
thinking that lessons applicable in the bus industry could also be applied in rail. 
 
That said, the following conceptual weaknesses about the privatisation process, 
in New Zealand anyway, are certainly apparent. In both privatisations, there 
was very little acknowledgement of the wider benefits of having freight shifted 
by rail instead of on the roading network. At the time, this was mostly seen in 
terms of road safety benefits (fewer trucks on the main highways), but we would 
now add a number of environmental benefits (peak oil, climate change issues) 
as well. Second, the process did not pay sufficient attention to the risks of 
failure – and what you would then have to do if the company did fail. Certainly, 
absolutely no-one had allowed for the underlying secular change in the 
economy which was moving away from producing the sorts of items that a 
railway can carry most efficiently.  
  
The repurchase of the railways represents a full circle in New Zealand policy, 
just as much as a return to vertical integration in the British context would 
represent a full circle. But why have we ended up there, and why have some rail 
privatisations not worked? To answer this question we must understand the 
funding of the railway system; and we must also understand the policy 
challenge of paying public subsidy to a monopoly. When these two questions 
are answered, we will be able to see why privatisation was always going to be a 
risky affair. As a comparison, we will also see why the privatisation of the former 
British Airports Authority was always going to be a much safer, less risky 
proposition.  
 
3. THE INFLUENCE OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
 
We will start off by examining two fundamental questions: the extent to which a 
business can cover its costs and then – separately – the extent to which a 
business can be considered to be monopolistic. We may plot this out on a chart, 
leaving us with four cells to populate: 
 
Fig 1 Subsidy and competitive provision: theory 
Profitability (from less to more) 
   
 [1] [3] 
 
 
 [2] [4] 
 
  Monopoly status (from less to more) 
 
In the first cell, we see businesses which are profitable and in a competitive 
environment (sometimes known as „competition in the market‟). Shipping, 
airlines, and truck companies are in this situation, and it is not a major public 
policy concern, safety and environmental issues excluded.  
 
In the second cell, we see businesses which cannot cover their costs from the 
market, but which can be provided competitively via public tendering. Here, we 
see „competition for the market‟. The provision of subsidised bus, ferry and air 
services within Scotland is an excellent example of this process at work, and 
the franchised part of the railway system can be fitted in here as well. So also 
can the London bus system. 
 
In the third cell we start to see businesses which in their structure provide an 
excellent „compare and contrast‟ for any railway system. Here, we are in the 
situation of electricity and gas transmission, Scottish Water, air traffic control 
and BAA plc (British Airport Authority, which owns the main UK airports). The 
businesses are profitable, sometimes strongly so, and because of this – and 
because the provision of the service is effectively monopolistic – they are 
regulated as well. Frequently, businesses of this type are also regulated in order 
to provide socially necessary but financially unviable services, via cross-subsidy 
and „universal service‟ requirements.  The Royal Mail is an example in point. 
 
   
 
In the fourth cell, we have the situation facing most railway networks – 
effectively, a monopoly supplier, but one which is heavily dependent on subsidy. 
That said, rail is not the only transport infrastructure in this situation. In 
Scotland, the Highlands & Islands Airport Company (HIAL) is another excellent 
example of the situation in which Network Rail finds itself, except that it is 
clearly and explicitly publicly-owned. Over sixty percent of its annual revenue is 
either from an operational grant or a capital grant 14, and this is quite separate 
from the direct subsidies to users and some subsidised (PSO) airline services 
as well. So also does Tranz Rail, in the way in which it was and is a monopoly 
supplier of rail services for meeting public policy as distinct from market goals 
(such as the goal of fewer trucks on the road network; its market situation is 
extremely competitive). Also in this category, we have the canals network in 
Great Britain.  
 
Figure 2 below populates Figure 1 above with more examples of various 
transport businesses and other sectors.  
 
Fig 2 Subsidy and competitive provision: in practice 
  
y-axis: GENERATES PROFIT 
 
 Any competitive transport business not  BAA, British Telecom, the roads  
 requiring subsidy – most commercial network, the Royal Mail (then), 
 bus & coach services, for example;  water, electricity and gas 
 many port operations, rail freight in   transmission; some port 
 Great Britain, open access rail operations; the road network (in 
 operators, commercial broadcasting, fiscal terms); air traffic control; Scottish  
 Tranz Rail (in original market terms) Water; other network industries 
 
 
 Tendered bus services, most passenger The railway network in Great Britain, 
 rail franchises, Calmac (in theory), Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd, 
 PSO-supported air services, the London the canal system in Great Britain, 
 bus system, concession fare Calmac (in practice, because of 
 systems; any business requiring strategic factors), the road network 
 competition for  the market ; (in governance terms), public 
 primary health care broadcasting, Tranz Rail (in terms of 
     external benefits); hospitals   
 
 REQUIRES SUBSIDY 
 
x-axis: Competitively provided Monopolistically provided 
 
The extent to which the railway industry in Great Britain fits the example of a 
subsidy-dependent network monopoly can be illustrated from this table, using 
data for 2008/09 15. These data are from the industry‟s annual yearbook, with 
some simplification. 
  £m 
Fares income  6,004 
TOC subsidy, net  273 \ Miscellaneous support 
PTE subsidy  317 / excluded  
Network Rail grant 4,266 Paid directly by the Government 
Gross costs  10,860 
  
That is, the industry covers 55 percent of its gross costs from fares; but the 
other critical factor is the volume of these costs which is then absorbed by the 
network. Of the £10,860m in total system costs, the network absorbed £5,799m 
in track access and grant income 16, some 53 percent. Also, network costs are 
by nature mostly fixed in the medium- or even the longer-term, and this flows 
straight through into the subsidy requirement if revenues cannot cover costs. A 
network is for life, not just for Christmas.  
 
In terms of financing the railways, we have the interesting counter-example of 
Sweden, in which the operations and the network (Banverket) have been 
separate since 1998. About forty percent the network‟s annual operating costs 
are charged out to the users as track access charges; these are based on the 
share of the cost base which can be held to be „marginal‟. The balance is paid 
by the Swedish Government as a direct grant, and assistance for capital 
expenditure is quite separate again. Any investment in the network is paid for 
out of a separate government grant, which in 2007 was quite a bit more than the 
operating grant *. The core passenger network is operated and funded 
separately but with a separate subsidy for contracted services 17. Although the 
financial flows provide an interesting compare-and-contrast with those in Great 
Britain, the system is far more transparent. In both cases, though, the ratio of 
infrastructural costs to all costs within the railway sector is far higher than what 
we would normally see in a comparable industry such as short-haul aviation. 
There, the costs equivalent to what is provided by Network Rail, comprise only 
about 20-25 percent of the system‟s costs overall 18. And as a further contrast: 
data for New Zealand, where the costs of providing the road network are met 
directly by road users, show that the equivalent of „network charges‟ in a 
roading environment, are only ten percent or so of the total costs for a road 
freight operation 19.  
 
With the model above in place, we can now go about answering the 
fundamental question: why rail privatisation in the New Zealand environment 
could not have worked, especially once some fundamental public policy goals 
became compromised. The rail operation is now in the situation of a failed 
privatisation, because the Government has had to retake ownership; but that is 
because the New Zealand freight market is not strong enough to meet the costs 
of railway provision, and in reality that has been the situation for at least the last 
forty years +.  
 
                                                 
*
  In 2007, the total grant to Banverket was just short of SEK16.7 bn (£1.5 bn), of which 
SEK10.6 bn (£942m) was allocated for capital works and SEK 6.1 bn (£546m) for operations. 
The user fees (track access charges) received from operators comprised a further SEK 3.9 
bn (£344m) of revenues; thus, less than 40 percent of annual operating costs, and less than 
20 percent of all the cash received by the business in that year. The model the Swedes use 
is very like that employed for Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd, although HIAL covers 50 
percent of its operating costs and40 percent of all cash disbursements from user revenues. 
+  Heatley (2009) is strongly of the view that New Zealand Governments shouldn‟t be bothering 
to subsidise its railway system. He is also not sure whether railways in New Zealand have 
ever been profitable, and blames political interference over the years as contributing to this 
state of affairs.   
   
 
4. WHY PRIVATISATION DIDN’T WORK: THE ISSUE OF RISK 
 
There is plenty of profitable (if regulated) private monopoly provision in the 
transport sector, and there are plenty of subsidised services which are 
competitively provided as well (mostly, but not restricted to, bus services). That 
is shown in the table above. That said, the thrust of this paper is that rail 
privatisation in New Zealand could not have worked, not because rail is a 
monopoly, or because it needs subsidy, but because of the combination of 
these two factors. Put another way, the presence in a business of both high 
fixed costs and high subsidy demands makes privatisation an extremely 
problematic policy option. Businesses of this nature are simply not good 
candidates for privatisation, and the reason, fundamentally, is that of business 
risk: 
 
First, this sort of business arrangement creates risks for the Government 
This problem can be well illustrated from a British perspective. In 2000 and 
2001 Railtrack were negotiating with the Government of the time in order to 
recover their situation, which thanks to the WCML was going very, very badly 20. 
The situation in which Railtrack had left the Government was quite invidious, 
because the Government could hardly afford to have the railways stop 
operating, yet it had had no influence on what Railtrack had done to get itself 
into this situation. The fate of both the Jubilee Line tube extension (which was 
meant to cost £1.9 bn but ended up costing £3.5 bn), never mind the WCML 
project, suggests that past Government efforts to try to pass on business risk 
have been a false economy. This also sheds light on the situation in New 
Zealand: simply, the Government was not prepared to spend money on the rail 
system unless it had a direct control over the business. Generally, governments 
will generally only support these businesses if they own them as well. 
 
Second, this sort of business arrangement creates risk for the operator 
Another British example, but from the other side of the fence. Railtrack 
discovered too late the risk of being in a business where your prime customer is 
ultimately the Government, given the degree to which your commercial 
customers (the TOCs) are reliant on Government subsidy to be in business in 
the first place. Market risk is one thing that companies can and do manage, but 
governmental risk, where a government‟s own preferences can change very 
suddenly, is another matter. While the risk of having a dominant private sector 
customer can be managed, public funding can be infamously unstable, 
regulator or not. In the situations we have been talking about, the option to 
reduce risk by diversifying your customer base is frequently not there. An 
airport, if it loses a major customer to bankruptcy – which is fairly frequent – can 
work round to find another. A rail network simply does not have that option, 
given that its „prime customer‟ is fundamentally the Government. It is 
noteworthy that after Railtrack‟s collapse, one firm did look at purchasing the 
network but withdrew when they realised what risks were involved 21. Certainly, 
when this writer was working for the suburban railway operation in New Zealand 
– and in an environment, remember, where there was no Regulator to referee 
things – there were occasions when the monthly urban grant could and would 
be clawed back, due to something going wrong which was simply not within our 
control to do anything about.  
  
Third, there is the risk that a regulatory structure itself can create 
As Rail Regulator, Tom Winsor illustrated how a regulatory structure can create 
risks, for both the Government and the business alike. At a seminar in 2006, he 
discussed how he had determined his settlement for Network Rail for Control 
Period 2 (April 1999-March 2004). As he put it, “I set a very large number for the 
size of the Network output, which Treasury did not like” 22; presumably the sum 
was much larger than they had wanted or even expected. (The risk of this 
happening again was substantially removed by a change to the legislation in 
2005, which requires the Regulatory Settlement to have a view to the „State-
ment of Funds Available‟ (SOFA)). Again from the other side of the fence, 
Railtrack discovered the hard way that the Regulator could not be relied on to 
save them from the consequences of their own very bad decisions *.  
 
The essential lesson is that a subsidy-dependant monopoly has to remain within 
the public sector, because of the risks for both funder and provider if it remains 
outside – simply put, the risks are too great. If we look at the bottom right-hand 
quadrant of Figure 1b above, we see a slew of industries which are not 
privatised and which cannot be privatised. That said, some of the businesses 
within the other quadrants of the model have remained in public ownership, 
because of a variety of other strategic or public policy factors. Scottish Water is 
a case in point.  
 
4.1 Why you need a fat controller 
The comparison with the UK‟s other network industries also raises this question. 
Railway professionals are often heard to say that „railways are different‟ and 
that a major cause of the difficulty post-1993 was the fragmentation of the 
industry. Much is still heard of the problems arising from „the separation of 
wheel and rail‟, and that you cannot easily run a railway where these are 
managed separately. Indeed, it is quite clear that the fragmentation within the 
industry further drove up the costs in the British situation. 
 
However, there some counter-examples which need consideration within this 
discussion: 
 
● The example of New Zealand‟s railway post-privatisation also makes 
it clear that keeping wheel and track together is still no guarantee 
that you will get it right.  
 
● In American freight railroads, which don‟t for the most part need (or 
receive) subsidy, there is no problem with one operator working over 
another‟s network via the use of commercially-negotiated „trackage 
rights‟ and specific interchange rules. Here, a contractual regime for 
railway access – as opposed to a command-and-control one – 
seems to work. 
                                                 
*
  A further part of the problem, which affected all sides of the newly privatised railway industry, 
is that the industry was bequeathed a regulatory approach based on that used for the former 
nationalised industries. The critical difference is that these industries are not nearly as reliant 
on the taxpayer as what the railway industry is, as a whole, but that distinction, and its 
effects, were not understood for some time. 
   
 
● As the cases of the Heathrow Express, the freight companies, and 
the open access operations all demonstrate – the „fragmentation‟ of 
the system is not a problem for them. In these specific cases, it is 
surely of relevance that they are paying only the marginal costs of 
their operation on Network Rail‟s system, and the Heathrow Express 
carries the costs of its own infrastructure and rolling stock without 
further subsidy. 
 
● In a European context, separation of network and operation has 
worked reasonably well, although as the example of Sweden shows, 
the government‟s control over the industry‟s finances is much plainer, 
and the governance arrangements are much more transparent. 
Certainly, the governance of Network Rail is often mentioned as a 
key issue in the British situation, and something which the current 
government appears to be looking at much more closely. A review of 
current European practice shows that a variety of ways of organising 
the railway network are now in place – some systems have the 
network as a standalone business within the main railway company, 
other systems have the network organised quite separately, as a 
separate company, and Sweden and Finland have recently merged 
their railway network and highways agencies. In each case, though, 
the governance is transparent and straightforward. 
 
Essentially, a command-and-control structure is really only needed in a network 
industry when that industry is as subsidy-driven as railways are. In this instance, 
vertical integration does reduce costs, especially what economists call 
„transaction costs‟. But the physical separation of wheel and rail may not in itself 
be the issue.  
 
Dr Johnson once observed that „comparisons are odious‟. Comparisons can be 
fascinating as well. This can be seen when we compare railways with another 
capital-intensive network industry – aviation. Now, the aviation sector is far 
more fragmented than rail – there are a multiplicity of operating companies, 
never mind general (private) aviation; the foreign aircraft in one‟s airspace are 
not necessarily working to your safety regime; and air traffic control (the 
equivalent of signalling) is quite separate from the infrastructure providers (ie. 
the airports). But, of course, the difference is that aviation does not need 
financial subsidy to keep going, except for some specific exceptions such as the 
Highlands, where the weight of demand is insufficient to meet the system‟s fixed 
costs. In that instance, the Scottish Government owns the airport system, and 
subsidises it directly. Normally, in a commercial situation, the transmission 
mechanisms for what the customers want do work – because money on the 
table has that effect. 
  
On any realistic measure, the privatisation of BAA, and most of the other 
formerly-nationalised industries, has worked – so why did it work for BAA, and 
BT (British Telecoms) for that matter, and not for British Rail? The essential 
answer, given that both BAA and BT are monopolistic, lies in the way that public 
funds will always be in short supply. This means that monopoly supply of a 
service when the government has to pay for it, creates pressures that genuinely 
  
market situations and funding do not face. Most Governments eventually realise 
that the risk is not worth it, even allowing for the private sector‟s carrying the 
debt. If Network Rail‟s status is changed in the next little while, the taking-back 
on board the public sector‟s books of its debts will also allow a significant 
change in its governance.  
 
Thus, the environment for companies such as BAA and NATS (National Air 
Traffic Services, the air traffic control company) rests in striking contrast to the 
railway industry. Indeed, the rail sector also stands apart from nearly all other 
transport modes, in that what people are prepared to pay for railway services is 
nowhere near what it costs to provide those services – rail‟s fundamental 
financial weakness, perhaps. Most other parts of the transport system meet the 
financial costs of their provision from users (including roads, when one 
considers the size of road taxation in relation to the money spent on the 
network). Rail is still the main exception (the other is the canal network, and its 
business is much more about providing a public amenity than about providing 
transport services). The frequent complaints that „profit maximisation is not the 
public interest!‟ also reminds us that the public interest, however one defines it, 
costs public money. And public money will always be in short supply; money put 
into a railway is money that is not available for any number of other „good 
causes‟ 23. There are simply too many other demands, and this was well 
apparent before the credit crunch.  
 
So, from a policy point of view, the example of New Zealand makes clear that 
where an industry is both monopolistic and subsidy-driven, as Tranz Rail finally 
became, direct Government ownership and control will be essential. This 
applies both if the railway‟s „monopoly nature‟ arises from its provision of 
transport services, or of the positive externalities which arise from its operation. 
This structural reality will need to flow through into the business‟s governance; 
otherwise, Governments will simply not sign „blank cheques‟ to support 
operations of this nature. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
For public policy to be effective, it has to be designed and applied against a 
clear target. The underlying reasons underlying rail privatisation in Great Britain 
were understood well enough at least in theory, but the structure which was 
adopted to apply the policy, did not match the underlying intent and in many 
ways made the perceived „problem‟ worse. In New Zealand, while intent and 
application did match, the intent did not allow for two things. First, that a freight 
railway in New Zealand would eventually prove to be unsustainable, in strict 
commercial terms. Second, that once that situation was comprehended, that 
separate strategic issues would come into play which would mean the reversal 
of the eventual policy. As well, in neither the British nor the New Zealand case 
was the question asked, “what happens if this approach fails?” The risk of policy 
failure was not appreciated or even acknowledged, in either case, and it is likely 
that a more realistic risk assessment would have influenced the structure that 
was eventually adopted.  
   
 
5.1 Afterword 
Under the previous Government some significant amounts were invested in 
both the rail network, and then the rail operation – money that would never have 
been committed had either business remained in the private sector. However, 
and since this paper was originally conceived, a change of Government in New 
Zealand in November 2008 has led to a significant change of policy. This can 
be summarised as: moving from a view which saw a commitment to retaining all 
of the current network, and investing in at least some of it, to a view which is 
best defined as committing only to the main core of the freight system 24. A 
substantial sum ($NZ250m) has been committed for investment in the main 
network 25, with the aim of making the rail commercially sustainable in the 
longer term (a sentiment which proves once and for all that there is truly 
„nothing new under the sun‟!). However, the investment is going to be focussed 
on just the main network, and it is also clear that no longer will the current 
Government support loss-making parts of the system. Already, one branch line 
has been mothballed when its reinstatement could not be justified on strict 
commercial terms. On top of this, the Government has also agreed to an 
increase in the maximum weight of trucks on the road, thus putting some rail 
loads at risk to increased competition 26. The maximum has been increased 
from 44 to 53 tonnes, under certain strict conditions. This is of real concern to 
the railway operator, because of the risk to a large number of its traffics 
comprising about 15 percent of its revenue 27.  
 
Given the length of the network whose retention is now at risk, this could be the 
harbinger of the winding-down of most of the branch network and even some of 
the main railway network: the decisions that could not be taken in 1990 or even 
in 2004 are looking more likely in 2010 and beyond, especially as the 
commercial realities of the railway system are now accepted by the present 
Government in a way that previous Governments did not accept. The wheel has 
come full circle, and it is still turning.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented in a staff seminar at Transport 
Scotland at the end of 2009, and some feedback given to that presentation, and the 
following discussion, has been incorporated in this paper. Thanks are also due to a 
former colleague who has provided some very helpful insight on the material.  
2 This writer worked for Tranz Rail between February 1996 and early 2005, at which 
point he left to come out to the UK. Prior to that, he worked for New Zealand‟s 
highways administration.  
3 There are 4,100 km of line in New Zealand, although most of it is single-track, 
compared with 3,042 route-km operated by First Scotrail. Refer the National Rail 
Trends yearbook for 2008-9;  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport_in_New_Zealand; and,  
Kiwirail‟s Annual Report for 2008/09: 
http://www.kiwirail.co.nz/uploads/Publications%20and%20Reports/KiwiRail%20Annual
%20Report%2009%20(web).pdf. The total length of railway within Scotland proper has 
been reported at 1,520 route-miles by Network Rail (2,451 route-kilometres; the value 
for FirstScotrail quoted in this footnote includes the sleeper services which run from 
Scotland to Euston). Refer here, p14: 
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisa
tion%20strategies/scotland/scotland%20rus.pdf 
4 An extensive history of the railway network in New Zealand, especially in the context 
of  this paper, is, Dave Heatley (2009), “The history and future of rail in New Zealand”, 
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, Wellington: Victoria 
University of Wellington. A .pdf of the paper can be found here: 
http://www.iscr.org.nz/f511,14914/14914_The_history_and_future_of_rail_in_New_Zea
land_RR_.pdf 
5 The land over which the railway ran was not included in the sale, but paid for annually 
under a „peppercorn‟ lease. This was done for some legal reasons it is not within the 
scope of this paper to examine. 
6 Refer: http://www.nzta.govt.nz/resources/research/reports/283/docs/283.pdf  
7 In New Zealand, trucks over 3.5 tonnes in weight pay “road user charges”, which is a 
distance-weight tax, to contribute to their share of the costs of the roading network. 
This tax, along with a separate tax on petrol, is hypothecated to support the costs to 
the Government of the roading network. The distance-weight tax is calibrated against 
the weight on the axle, and is based on a principle of road engineering called the 
fourth-power rule – that is, if the weight at the axle is doubled, then the amount of road 
damage caused increases sixteenfold (24 = 16), for a given pavement strength. This 
has the effect that heavy truck loads pay a lot more per tonne carried than lighter truck 
loads, for a given distance travelled, and this regime also provides some de facto 
assistance to the railway network. More details are available from this writer. Refer also 
Heatley, op. cit., p39. 
8 This writer‟s personal recollection 
9 Refer:  
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/freight/news/article.cfm?c_id=500815&objectid=10404425. 
This was not commercial grandstanding on Toll‟s part. Toll were quite seriously looking 
at abandoning services, including over large parts of the current „main trunk‟ system, 
and including all the branch network. The Treasury‟s view of Toll‟s situation is 
discussed further in footnotes 24 and 25 below. 
10  Refer “Coastal Shipping and modal freight choice”, prepared for the New Zealand 
Transport Agency by Rockport Corporate Finance Ltd, p60. URL: 
http://www.rockpoint.co.nz/publications/Rockpoint%20Coastal%20Shipping.pdf 
11 Refer, for example: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0708/S00315.htm  
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                                                               
12 Refer: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/category/story.cfm?c_id=97&objectid=10508714 
13 Refer comments by Gerald Corbett, as quoted by Alan Marshall in the November 
2009 Railnews, p12.  
14 Refer: 
http://hial.rippleffect.com/assets/_files/documents/nov_09/hia__1259169411_Annual_R
eport_2008_09.pdf 
15 Refer Tables 1.3a and 6.2a of the National Rail Trends, 2008/09 (published by the 
Office of Rail Regulation).  
16  Refer Table 3, p68 of the Network Rail 2008/09 Annual Report  
17 Refer: http://www.sj.se/sj/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=120&a=8175&l=en# (Annual Report, in 
English, for 2008 of Statens Järnvägar (the main operating company). 
18  Refer “Airways seeks rise in charges to pay for gear”, New Zealand Herald, 23 
November 2009:  
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10610930 
The ratio reported here of 25 percent (that is, of infrastructural costs to all costs) seems 
to be „par for the course‟ in the short-haul aviation sector (that is, whose journey 
sectors lengths are comparable in length with long-distance rail within Great Britain). 
The ratio for longer-distance airline services is a lot lower again; about 5 percent of 
operating costs for a carrier like Singapore Air.  
19 Refer: http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/Land/RoadUserCharges/ 
20 Refer The Guardian, April 1 2004 – “The £10 bn rail crash”; for more information: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/01/transport.politics 
21 Refer: http://everything2.com/title/Railtrack  
22 This writer‟s personal recollection.  
23 For example, refer Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of 
Public Money, Macmillan‟s, second edition 1981. 
24 More information on this can be found in the New Zealand Treasury papers on rail‟s 
refinancing. Allowing for some editing for “commercial – in confidence” considerations, 
they reflect the situation to June 2009, when these papers were released. Refer: 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/rail/policy-kiwirail.  
25 Refer: “$750m over three years to bulk up Kiwirail” New Zealand Herald,18th May 
2010: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/rail/news/article.cfm?c_id=296&objectid=10645820. 
Also refer to these 2010 Budget papers: 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/budget/2010/otherpapers 
(and look under “Transport”). The $250m relates to the money which has been formally 
committed. 
26 Refer “Change lifts truck load limit to 53 tonnes”, New Zealand Herald 6 April 2010: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/freight/news/article.cfm?c_id=500815&objectid=10636549. 
Also, the following link has more stories: 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/freight/news/archive.cfm?c_id=500815 
27 Refer fn. 25 above, and also: The Transport Worker, June 2010 (published by the 
RMTU), pp 6,9,20,21). Refer: 
http://www.rmtunion.org.nz/publications/documents/TTW2-FINAL.pdf 
 
 
